Hierarchical ownership and deterministic watermarking of digital images via polynomial interpolation by Boato, Giulia et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY 
OF TRENTO 
 DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
  
38050 Povo – Trento (Italy), Via Sommarive 14 
http://www.dit.unitn.it 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HIERARCHICAL OWNERSHIP AND DETERMINISTIC WATERMARKING 
OF DIGITAL IMAGES VIA POLYNOMIAL INTERPOLATION 
 
G. Boato, F. G.B. De Natale, C. Fontanari, and F. Melgani 
 
 
June 2006 
 
Technical Report DIT-06-038 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
Hierarchical ownership and
deterministic watermarking of digital images
via polynomial interpolation
G. Boato1, F.G.B. De Natale1, C. Fontanari2, and F. Melgani1
1Dept. of Information and Communication Technology, University of Trento,
Via Sommarive 14, I-38050, Trento, Italy.
2Dept. of Mathematics, Fac. of Information Engineering, Politecnico di Torino,
Corso Duca degli Abruzzi 24, I-10129, Torino, Italy.
{boato,melgani}@dit.unitn.it; denatale@ing.unitn.it; claudio.fontanari@polito.it
Keywords: image watermarking, joint ownership, polynomial interpolation.
Abstract
This paper presents a novel method for the secure management of digital ima-
ges formulated within the mathematical theory of polynomial interpolation. As
main innovative features, our approach is based on a hierarchical joint ownership
of the image by a trusted layered authority and on a deterministic watermarking
procedure, embedding a short meaningful or random signature into the image.
Experimental results show that the inserted signature can almost always be fully
recovered even in presence of a reasonable amount of image degradation due to
image processing operators, such as filtering, geometric distortions and compres-
sion.
1. Introduction
In the last decade, digital watermarking techniques have raised a great deal of
interest in the scientific community since the pioneering contribution by Cox et
al. [1]. Indeed, the practice of imperceptible alteration of a document to embed
a message into it plays a key role in the challenging field of ownership right pro-
tection. Much progress has been done in the last few years (see for instance [2]),
but no general solution has been reached so far. This can be explained by several
different factors, among which the heterogeneity of the requirements imposed by
each application context and the clear definition and the operational mechanisms
of the authority that would deal with the ownership verification process. In other
words, currently proposed watermarking techniques strongly depend on the appli-
cation scenario.
Let us consider the specific case, where a public or private organization needs
to keep control on internal resources distributed to a number of users. In such
a context, the organization can be regarded as an authority which has free ac-
cess to the original data and assigns watermarked copies to users, who ignore the
presence of the watermark. In this particular application scenario, two different
problems need to be addressed: i) the management of the original data by the
authority (which is trustworthy as a whole but includes possibly untrusted mem-
bers); and ii) the selection of a proper watermarking technique. A well-known
example is provided by the distribution of uniquely identifiable copies of a confi-
dential British cabinet document to each minister by Margaret Thatcher in 1981.
Hence, when the document was printed in the newspapers, the source of the leak
could be discovered ([3], p. 4). Another realistic example for this application sce-
nario is the case of the management of a set of confidential images involved in a
legal prosecution. The control of their access is shared by the judging court (the
authority) which is a hierarchical structure (president, members of the jury, etc.).
The images should be made available to a group of persons (the users) involved di-
rectly or indirectly in the prosecution process such as lawyers, officers, etc. Since
the users may be not trusted, the authority wants to be able to detect possible ille-
gal leakages. To achieve this goal, the images given to the users are watermarked
with a signature that uniquely identifies them. In case of violation, an authorized
subgroup of the authority can identify the source of the leakage. Accordingly,
the two main ingredients of this kind of copyright management scheme are: i) a
joint ownership of the original data in a group with hierarchical structure; and ii) a
watermarking procedure which can exploit the original data in the reconstruction
phase (i.e., it is not necessarily blind) and whose existence is hidden to users (i.e.,
it is steganographic according to the terminology of [3]).
As far as the authority is concerned, we stress that we consider the possibility
to cope with untrusted member and therefore we need to find a way to manage
the original data in a distributed way, exploiting the hierarchical structure of the
organization. The hierarchical ownership handling, has been recently addressed
in the context of digital image watermarking by Guo and Georganas [4], whose
work exploits a secret sharing procedure generalizing the basic scheme by Shamir
[5]. A (k, n)-threshold sharing scheme allows to divide a secret into n shares and
requires the knowledge of at least k out of n shares to reconstruct the original
content. Each share does not carry any meaningful partial plaintext of the secret
and, if the number of shares available is less than k, a potential attacker can do no
better than guessing, even with infinite computing time and power. Nevertheless,
the solution in [4] has the annoying drawback that the procedure of shares distri-
bution is expensive in terms of storage and complexity, since a huge number of
shares is assigned to each participant. For a critical analysis of this algorithm, we
refer to [6].
As an alternative, in this paper we propose a more sophisticated approach
based on Birkhoff polynomial interpolation. Its main advantage is that the secret
sharing is simplified by assigning just a single real number to each member of
the group (no matter how complicated the corresponding access structure). An
authorized subset of the authority can access the original data only if it includes
a sufficient number of members for each level in the organization. Referring to
the above example, this means that to access an image used in a legal prosecution
one can need 1 actor of the highest level (e.g., the president) and 2 actors of
the second level (e.g., two members of the jury). An interesting property of the
proposed hierarchical scheme is its flexibility. Indeed, it can be applied to manage
the access to different types of data (not only images) and combined with various
kinds of watermarking methods depending on the application requirements and
not only with that described in the following.
Concerning this last aspect, since the organization needs to keep control on
copies distributed to a certain number of users, it is natural to apply a fingerprint-
ing method by assigning to each user a unique watermark which identifies the
legal recipient of the copy. Furthermore, because of the application considered,
we require an exact reconstruction of the signature (watermark) assigned to each
user and we assume that the users ignore the presence of the watermark (stegano-
graphic watermarking), hence no malicious attacks (e.g. collusion attack) need
to be taken into account. Nevertheless, a user may need to perform some simple
processing to use the data (e.g., to compress and store the data in a database or
to resize it for page formatting and printing). Since the authority needs to trace
the source of illegally redistributed copies, such non-malicious image process-
ing operations should be considered in the testing of the watermarking process
robustness. In order to fulfil the first requirement, instead of considering a ran-
dom sequence as watermark and just a correlation measure for its detection as
in [1], here a meaningful signature has to be embedded and the watermark de-
tection should lead to a perfect recovery of the inserted signature. Such kind of
watermarking schemes belongs to the category of readable watermarks according
to the terminology of [7] (see for instance [8] and [9], just to quote a couple of
recent contributions). In the specific context of image forensic, a version of the
secret message has to be extracted from the stego message ([10]), but the problem
of accepting digital image watermarking as a legal evidence of ownership is still
widely open ([11], [12]). As a possible solution to this problem we propose the
use of a deterministic signature to be perfectly reconstructed.
Specifically, the signature written in English alphabet is first translated into a
sequence of integers by means of a look-up table. Such a sequence of integers is
used to set the coefficients of a trigonometric polynomial, from which a prede-
fined number of samples is extracted evaluated at equally spaced points. Finally,
the values of the samples are embedded into the lowest frequency coefficients of
the original image transformed into the DCT domain (excluding the DC compo-
nent as in [1]). The watermark extraction process is based on solving a system
of linear equations defined by the recovered samples. It is worth mentioning that,
in [13] and [14], an analogous sinusoidal pattern has already been successfully
exploited to embed a pseudo-random sequence. In these works, however, the de-
tection of the watermark was just limited to a correlation measurement. In our
watermarking scheme, characterized by a full reconstruction of the watermark,
the choice of a trigonometric rather than an algebraic polynomial is motivated by
the fact that standard polynomial interpolation is ill-conditioned, while the use of
trigonometric functions allows to keep the condition number of the corresponding
linear system close to the optimal value 1. In order to obtain a reliable determinis-
tic polynomial reconstruction, we need to face the problem of image degradations
due to the application of such standard image processing operators. Despite the
preservation of the global quality of the image, the degradation may drastically
corrupt some entries of the DCT image where the watermark is inserted. We over-
come this issue by a suitable selection of the DCT samples conveying the water-
mark. In order to assess the effectiveness of the proposed watermarking approach,
based on a hierarchical authority of ownership verification, we make use of a very
large set of test images of different typologies. Experimental results show that our
method exhibits a satisfactory effectiveness: the signature is reconstructed with
100% of accuracy for a wide range of image degradation operators. Furthermore,
high performance is obtained in terms of false detection even in critical situations
involving both users identified with very close signatures and strongly corrupted
images.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, we present a hierarchical
secret sharing scheme for the joint ownership of the original image; in Section 3,
we describe the generation, the embedding and the reconstruction phases of the
watermarking scheme; in Section 4, we report experimental results; and in Sec-
tion 5, we draw some concluding remarks.
2. Hierarchical joint ownership
2.1. Previous work
The main feature of a nonblind watermarking scheme is that the original image
is needed in the reconstruction phase. As a consequence, an authority group A
managing this process has to memorize the cover image, preferably storing it in a
distributed (e.g., hierarchical) way for security reasons. As mentioned in the pre-
vious Section, in order to do that it is natural to apply a secret sharing procedure.
In this context, the basic secret sharing scheme proposed by Shamir [5] relies
on standard Lagrange polynomial interpolation. Specifically, a secret S ∈ R is
identified with some coefficient of a polynomial
p (x) =
k−1∑
i=0
aix
i (1)
where for instance a0 = S and a1, . . . , ak−1 are arbitrary real numbers. In order to
distribute S among n participants, just fix n distinct real numbers v1, . . . , vn and
assign to the j-th participant the share
p (vj) =
k−1∑
i=0
aiv
i
j (2)
In order to reconstruct the secret, a subset of participants with associated real
numbers {vi1 , . . . , vis} with 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < . . . < is ≤ n, has to solve the
following linear system:
V


a0
.
.
.
ak−1

 =


p (vi1)
.
.
.
p (vis)

 (3)
where
V =


1 vi1 . . . v
k−1
i1
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 vis . . . v
k−1
is

 (4)
is a so-called Vandermonde matrix ([15], p. 155). It follows that the linear system
(3) admits a unique solution if and only if s ≥ k. In particular, at least k out
of n shares are needed to reconstruct S, hence we obtain a (k, n)-secret sharing
scheme.
As pointed out in [5], a hierarchical variant can be introduced by simply as-
signing a higher number of shares to higher level participants. In the context of
digital image watermarking, a rather involved hierarchical secret sharing scheme
was proposed by Guo and Georganas [4], as already pointed out in the Introduc-
tion. More recently, a refined hierarchical scheme was obtained by Tassa [16]
from subtler properties of Birkhoff polynomial interpolation and improved fur-
ther in [17] for application to wireless ad hoc networks. Here we are going to
adapt from finite fields to real numbers this last approach, which seems to be
more efficient (assigning just one share to each member) and realistic (attributing
a qualitative rather than a quantitative difference between distinct levels). In the
following we will detail the proposed hierarchical joint ownership approach.
2.2. Proposed methodology
Let A be the authority group composed of n participants and let us consider a
collection Γ of subsets of A, which is monotone in the sense that if V ∈ Γ then
any set containing V also belongs to Γ. A threshold secret sharing scheme with
access structure Γ is a method of sharing a secret among the members of A, in
such a way that only subsets in Γ can recover the secret, while all other subsets
have no information about it. Assume that A is divided into t + 1 levels, i.e.,
A = ∪tl=0Al with Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for every i 6= j. In order to reconstruct the secret,
we require at least a fixed number of shares from each level. Formally, if 0 <
k0 < . . . < kt is a strictly increasing sequence of integers, then a (k0, . . . , kt;n)-
hierarchical threshold secret sharing scheme distributes to each participant a share
of a given secret S, in such a way that
Γ =
{
V ⊂ A : #
[
V ∩
(
∪il=0Al
)]
≥ ki ∀i = 0, . . . , t
} (5)
Roughly speaking, a subset of participants can reconstruct the secret if and only
if it contains at least k0 members of level 0; at least k1 members of level 0 and/or
level 1; at least k2 members of level 0 and/or 1 and/or 2; and so on.
In order to construct a suitable (k0, . . . , kt;n)-hierarchical threshold secret
sharing scheme for the joint ownership of the original image, it is natural to ap-
ply Birkhoff interpolation [18] instead of Lagrange interpolation [19]. In fact,
the Birkhoff scheme involves not only the polynomial, but also its (higher order)
derivatives. More precisely, let E = (Ei,j), i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 0, . . . , k − 1, be
an m× k interpolation matrix, with k entries equal to one and all remaining ones
equal to zero. Let X = x1, . . . , xm, x1 < x2 < . . . < xm, be a set of m distinct
interpolation points. For every i, j with Ei,j = 1 we consider the k interpolation
equations
p(j)(xi) = Bi,j (6)
where p(j) denotes the j-th derivative of a polynomial p of degree ≤ k − 1 as in
(1) and Bi,j are given data. Here the unknowns are the k coefficients a0, . . . , ak−1
of p. It is clear that such a Birkhoff interpolation problem can admit infinitely
many solutions even if the number of equations equals the number of unknowns,
i.e. m = k: for instance, assume that Ei,0 = 0 for every i = 1, . . . , n. In this case,
the interpolation system involves only derivatives of the polynomial p, hence it
keeps no track of the constant term a0, which will never be reconstructed. More
generally, elementary linear algebra considerations show that if the interpolation
matrix E = (Ei,j), i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 0, . . . , k − 1 does not satisfy the following
Po´lya condition ([18], p. 126)
# {Ei,j = 1 : j ≤ h} ≥ h+ 1, 0 ≤ h ≤ k − 1 (7)
then the corresponding Birkhoff interpolation problem admits infinitely many so-
lutions.
The idea now is to exploit this necessary condition in order to ensure that only
authorized subsets can reconstruct the secret. Intuitively speaking, an evaluation
of the polynomial itself carries more informations than an evaluation of any of its
derivatives since it involves more coefficients; therefore it sounds reasonable to
assign to a participant of higher level the evaluation of a lower order derivative.
More precisely, we propose the following algorithm:
1. Associate to the original image a secret key S identified with a sequence
(S0, . . . , Sz) with Si ∈ R for every 0 ≤ i ≤ z.
2. Let k = kt and pick a polynomial
p (x) =
k−1∑
i=0
aix
i (8)
where ai =


Si 0 ≤ i ≤ z
random z + 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1.
3. Identify each participant of level l with a random element v ∈ R and asso-
ciate to v the share p(kl−1) (v), where p(kl−1) (v) denotes as above the kl−1-th
derivative of p and by definition k−1 = 0. Fix now a subset of the authority
group V = {v1, . . . , vm} ⊂ A with m ≥ k. Up to reordering we may
assume that vi ∈ Vl(i) with l (i) ≤ l (j) for every i ≤ j (l (i) indicates the
level in the hierarchy of the i-th member of V ). Consider the m× k matrix
MV whose i-th row is given by
d
dxkl(i)−1
(
1, x, x2, . . . , x(k−1)
)
(vi) (9)
In order to reconstruct the secret key S, the members of V have to solve the
following linear system1:
MV


a0
.
.
.
ak−1

 =


pkl(1)−1 (v1)
.
.
.
pkl(m)−1 (vm)

 (10)
in the unknowns a0, . . . , ak−1.
The key point is that (10) is a Birkhoff interpolation problem with associated
interpolation matrix EV = (Ei,j), i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 0, . . . , k − 1 defined as
follows:
Ei,j =


1 if j = kl(i)−1
0 otherwise
(11)
In the following, we will prove two theorems that provide the theoretical
framework for the secret reconstruction. Both theorems are based on the following
auxiliary result:
1We observe that one can improve the numerical stability of the linear system (10) with a care-
ful choice of the random points v1, . . . , vm. Indeed, it is well known that interpolation problems
are usually ill conditioned and Chebyshev points represent the optimal choice as interpolation
nodes ([19], § 5). In order to obtain random points, just consider a small random perturbation of
Chebyshev points.
Lemma 1. V ∈ Γ if and only if EV satisfies the Po´lya condition.
Proof. If V ∈ Γ, then by (5) it contains at least k0 members of level 0, at least
k1 members in the union of level 0 and 1, and so on. From the third point of the
above algorithm, participants of level 0 receive an evaluation of the polynomial as
a share, participants of level 1 receive an evaluation of the k0-th derivative of the
polynomial as a share, and so on. Therefore, if we let Cj for j = 0, . . . , k − 1
denote the j-th column of the interpolation matrix EV , then Cj is a null column
for j /∈ {0, k0, k1, . . . , kt}, and C0 contains at least k0 ones, C0 ∪ Ck0 contains at
lest k1 ones, and so on. It follows that for every integer h with kl−1 ≤ h < kl
the union
⋃
0≤j≤kl−1
Cj contains at least kl ≥ h + 1 ones, hence (7) is satisfied.
Conversely, if V /∈ Γ, then EV does not satisfy (7) for at least one value of h and
therefore Po´lya condition does not hold.
Theorem 1. If V /∈ Γ then V cannot reconstruct the secret S.
Proof. Since V /∈ Γ, by Lemma 1 EV doesn’t satisfies Po´lya condition and it
follows that the corresponding Birkhoff interpolation problem admits infinitely
many solutions. Thus V cannot reconstruct the secret.
More precisely, if z = 0 then for every S0 ∈ R there is at least one solution
a0, . . . , ak of (10) with a0 = S0, hence all possibilities for the secret are equally
likely, exactly as in the scheme proposed by Shamir.
Next, we can apply Theorem 10.1 in [18], p.128, whose statement can be
rephrased as follows:
Proposition 1. A Birkhoff interpolation problem admits a unique solution for al-
most all choices of interpolation points x1, . . . , xm, i. e. outside of a subset of
R
m with m-dimensional measure equal to zero, if and only if it satisfies the Po´lya
condition.
Hence our random selection of the interpolation points allows us to deduce the
following:
Theorem 2. If V ∈ Γ then V recovers the secret S.
Proof. Since V ∈ Γ, by Lemma 1 EV satisfies Po´lya condition and with a ran-
dom selection of interpolation points it is possible to apply Proposition 1. Thus
the unique solution of the Birkhoff interpolation problem conveys the embedded
secret.
As a consequence, a set of participants can reconstruct the original image and
verify the presence of the watermark if and only if it belongs to the predefined
access structure.
3. The watermarking scheme
The aim of an authority A hierarchically organized into several levels is to dis-
tribute a given image I among a set of users u1, . . . , un, keeping some control on
the use of the image by each of them. In particular, for any copy of I , that may
undergo some image processing operations, any subset V ⊂ A in the given access
structure Γ should be able to identify without ambiguity the user from whom this
copy comes from. As summarized in Figure 1, a secure management of I can be
provided by the following procedure:
1. Fix k ∈ N not exceeding the number of pixels of I .
2. Apply the DCT to I and consider a k×k submatrix J = (Ji,j) corresponding
to the lowest frequency DCT coefficients.
3. Put the entries of J , but J0,0, into a vector S = (a0, . . . , az), where z =
k2 − 1 (the DC component is not used in the watermarking procedure).
4. Distribute S among all members of the group according to the rules de-
scribed in the Section 2, in such a way that only certain distinguished sub-
groups can recover S in order to use I in the watermarking reconstruction
phase.
3.1. Watermark generation
In our watermarking scheme, the watermark consists in a sequence of letters as-
signed to each user. Such a signature can be either random or meaningful accord-
ing to the authority requirements. Since we assume that the authority desires a full
reconstruction of the watermark, we exploit again a polynomial framework as it
will be described in the next subsections. According to a statistical analysis of the
letters in the English dictionary [20], we construct a look-up table based on the
principle that the more frequent a letter in the set of English words, the smaller the
integer in the interval [−13, 13] associated to it, so that the norm of the signature
is kept as small as possible.
3.2. Watermark embedding
As illustrated in Figure 2, for all users uq, 1 ≤ q ≤ n, each one identified by a
signature sq1, . . . , s
q
l of length l an authorized subset V ∈ Γ performs the following
procedure:
1. Consider the trigonometric polynomial2
pq(t) =
l∑
i=1
sqi sin(i2pit) (12)
2. Compute the sampling instants taken uniformly over the range [0, 1]
ti =
i
k2 − 1
i = 1, . . . , k2 − 1 (13)
2As already mentioned in the Introduction, standard polynomial interpolation is ill-
conditioned, while trigonometric functions allow to solve linear systems with condition number
closer to 1.
let N = max1≤i≤k2−1 |pq(ti)| and put the normalized evaluations of the
trigonometric polynomial at the sampling instants into the k × k square
matrix W q = (W qi,j) defined as follows:
W qi,j =


0 if i = j = 1
pq(t(i−1)k+j−1)/N otherwise
(14)
3. Watermark I by substituting every Ji,j with Ji,j(1 + αW qi,j), where α ∈ R
is a scaling factor, small enough to make the watermarked image Iq percep-
tually indistinguishable from I .
3.3. Watermark reconstruction
Let the image Iq be the watermarked copy of I given to the user uq, 1 ≤ q ≤
n, possibly decayed. In order to identify uq, an authorized subset V ∈ Γ first
reconstructs S by solving the linear system (10), puts it into a matrix and recovers
J . Then, for each user uq, 1 ≤ q ≤ n, with signature sq1, . . . , s
q
l , V performs the
following procedure (see Figure 3):
1. Apply the DCT transform to Iq and consider its k×k submatrix Jq = (Jqi,j)
corresponding to the lowest frequency DCT coefficients.
2. Define ∆ = (∆i,j) by setting
∆i,j = J
q
i,j − Ji,j(1 + αW
q
i,j)
where W q is computed as in 3.1.2.
3. Define the set K (t) = {(a, b) ∈ N × N such that |∆a,b| < t|Ja,b|} corre-
sponding to the least corrupted entries and fix the initial value t = 1.
4. If #K (t) < l, conclude that the signature of uq is not present in Iq. Other-
wise, compute N again as in 3.2.2 and solve the following linear system
l∑
i=1
sqi sin(i2pit(a−1)k+b−1) = (15)
=
(
Jqa,b/Ja,b − 1
) N
α
∀(a, b) ∈ K (t)
in the unknowns sq1, . . . , s
q
l and round the obtained solution to the closest
string of integers.
5. If the signature of uq is recovered with 100% of accuracy, then stop the pro-
cedure keeping track of the number #K (t). Otherwise, reduce the thresh-
old t of a 2% factor and go to Step 4. Notice that only a finite number of
repetitions of Step 4 is needed in order to conclude one way or another since
#K (t) decreases with t.
6. Finally, V ∈ Γ associates Iq to the user uq for which the signature has
been fully reconstructed. In case of conflicts, i.e., when it comes out that
several different signatures are fully reconstructed from Iq, V compares the
different values of #K (t) of the corresponding users and associates Iq to
the user uq showing the highest #K (t).
4. Experimental results
In this experimental phase, we implemented our watermarking approach setting
k = 16, l = 8, α = 0.1 and tested it on a set of 70 images of different nature
to deduce meaningful conclusions. In general, the watermark inserted in the im-
age is imperceptible since on average PSNR= 43 dB (see Figures 4 and 5). The
attacks we considered to verify the method robustness are the following standard
image degradation operations: additive white Gaussian noise with different power
values; additive uniform noise with variance equal to 12; 3 × 3 moving average;
Gaussian lowpass filtering of size 3 × 3 with standard deviation 0.5; rotation in
a counter-clockwise direction of at most 1.5 degrees using the nearest neighbor
interpolation method; resizing to various dimensions (down to one per cent of
the original image area) using the nearest neighbor interpolation method; JPEG
compression with quality factor down to 25%. For all these attacks, we tried to re-
construct the inserted signature with 100% of accuracy according to five different
experimental scenarios.
The first scenario intends to test the possibility of applying the method inde-
pendently of the image characteristics. This is done by inserting the same signa-
ture on the 70 available different images. The obtained results are summarized
in Table 1 with the signature DITUNITN (Department of Information and Com-
munication Technologies of the University of Trento). In this table, we report the
detection rate (DR), the average and the minimal numbers of samples selected for
watermark reconstruction (mean #K and min #K, respectively). The obtained
results demonstrate that the method is image independent. The embedded signa-
ture is recovered with 100% of accuracy for each image with a very high number
of samples.
The second scenario aims at assessing the sensitivity of the method to the
choice of the signature used to watermark the image. This is carried out by con-
sidering two images of different typologies like the Lena and Baboon images (see
Figures 4 and 5, respectively) distributed among 70 users to whom random signa-
tures were associated. For the two images, the quantitative results are reported in
Table 2 and 3, respectively. The watermarked Lena and Baboon images respond
very well to all attacks for every signature inserted. In addition, we report for each
attack also the plots showing the number of samples found for each signature (see
Figures 6 and 7). In all cases, a peak identifies the true signature corresponding
to position 35 in the plots. Notice that rotation decreases the #K most among all
degradation tested. Therefore, a specific variant of the method should be design
to be very robust to this kind of attack, but, to the best of our knowledge, there are
no proposals at present in the literature to achieve rotation-invariant watermarking
in the DCT domain ([21]).
In the third scenario we evaluate the probability of false detection in a unwa-
termarked image in the presence of increasing noise. We look for the signature DI-
TUNITN in a set of 100 unwatermarked Lena images corrupted by additive white
Gaussian noise. The achieved results are reported in Table 4, which shows the
average and the maximal number of samples selected. In all cases the number of
samples selected is less than the length l and therefore it is impossible to solve
the linear system (10) and reconstruct the signature. This demonstrates that the
watermark detection process is capable of extracting meaningful signatures only
if they have been indeed inserted into the image.
Due to the requirement of a 100% of accuracy in the decoding of the water-
mark in order to guarantee a legal evidence of ownership, it is important to test
the capability of our method to avoid false detections from degraded watermarked
images. To do so, in the fourth scenario we evaluate the false detection rate (FDR)
in a watermarked image corrupted by the presence of noise with increasing power.
The inserted signature (DITUNITN) is compared with a large number of randomly
generated signatures in terms of the number of samples selected in the recon-
struction phase. Actually, it may happen that also a random signature is perfectly
reconstructed (see Table 5), but in our application this is not a problem at all.
Indeed, since the authority needs to trace the source of illegally redistributed con-
tent, it will always control all signatures corresponding to all users, by performing
a systematic test as in the second scenario. As already pointed out in Section
3.3 step 6, in case of conflicts (namely, if more than one signature is fully recon-
structed) it is always possible to identify the really embedded signature by plotting
the number of samples selected (see also Fig. 6 and 7). In this way the false detec-
tion rate of the system is zero, as shown in Table 5, although the number of fully
reconstructed signatures besides the correct one is non zero. In fact, the number
of samples selected for the reconstruction of the inserted signature (DITUNITN
#K) is highly greater than the maximum #K among all signature variations.
The presented results demonstrate very well from an experimental viewpoint that
the parameter #K is definitely significant to fix-up the false positive problem.
Finally, since in our scenario the authority should be free to select an arbitrary
string, given an alphabet and a maximum string length, we are also interested
in assessing the detection performance of the method when signatures are very
close to each other. To this purpose, in the fifth experimental scenario we insert
the signature DITUNITN into the Lena image corrupting it by noise of increasing
power and we consider a set of four reference signatures differing from the correct
one (i.e., DITUNITN) in just one or two letters. The results confirm clearly the
capability of our method to deal suitably with such critical situations thanks to the
comparison mechanism. Table 6 reports the number of samples selected for each
of the five considered signatures.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a novel image watermarking technique which al-
lows a trusted authority to recover the ownership from any reasonably distorted
copy of an image distributed to several users. In order to do so, we embed into
the image the signature of the corresponding user in a redundant way, exploiting a
suitable trigonometric polynomial. The watermark detection is performed by the
authority, which is considered as a hierarchical group managing the original image
with a generalized secret sharing scheme based on Birkhoff polynomial interpola-
tion. From the experimental results, it emerges that a perfect reconstruction of the
signature can almost always be obtained for several kinds of image degradation
operators independently of the image characteristics and signature used. Further-
more, the proposed method shows high performance in terms of false detection
even in critical situations (strong image degradation and set of users identified
with very close signatures). Finally, as mentioned previously, we stress that our
hierarchical scheme is not constrained by the kind of watermarking technique
adopted. Indeed, it can be combined with techniques different from that proposed
in this paper in such a way to respond to other application requirements such as the
robustness against malicious attacks. This aspect represents one of the envisaged
future works.
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Table 1.
attack DR [%] mean #K min #K
add. gauss. noise 100 205 96
add. unif. noise 100 194 84
moving average 100 103 51
gaussian lpf 100 206 124
resizing (0.1) 100 134 80
rotation (1.5) 100 67 46
JPEG (25%) 100 154 69
Table 2.
attack DR [%] mean #K min #K
add. gauss. noise 100 201 46
add. unif. noise 100 201 181
moving average 99 126 61
gaussian lpf 100 200 192
resizing (0.1) 100 178 87
rotation (1.5) 99 54 8
JPEG (25%) 100 175 27
Table 3.
attack DR [%] mean #K min #K
add. gauss. noise 100 170 41
add. unif. noise 100 163 32
moving average 100 120 16
gaussian lpf 100 193 191
resizing (0.1) 100 86 11
rotation (1.5) 99 55 11
JPEG (25%) 100 82 10
Table 4.
SNR (dB) mean #K max #K
32.5 2.47 4
31.5 2.44 4
30.5 2.36 4
29.5 2.36 4
28.5 2.39 5
27.5 2.43 5
26.5 2.41 4
25.5 2.44 5
24.5 2.66 5
23.5 2.64 5
22.5 2.59 5
Table 5.
SNR (dB) DITUNITN #K mean #K max #K #f.r.s. FDR [%]
32.5 247 5.49 42 4 0
31.5 248 5.32 55 2 0
30.5 182 5.68 48 3 0
29.5 243 5.06 38 1 0
28.5 244 5.49 50 3 0
27.5 173 6.01 54 5 0
26.5 241 5.52 54 4 0
25.5 237 5.34 44 3 0
24.5 138 5.68 38 4 0
23.5 230 5.67 44 5 0
22.5 111 5.67 39 4 0
Table 6.
signature #K w.o. noise #K SNR 37.5 dB #K SNR 32.5 dB #K SNR 27.5 dB
DITUNITN 255 250 247 241
DITUNITV 3 6 4 7
DIEUNITN 5 6 6 54
DIMUNITN 5 32 43 28
DMAUNITN 5 5 4 35
